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Abstract in English 
The proposed Services Directive by the European Commission could increase intra European 
trade in commercial services by 30 to 60 percent. This paper analyses the welfare effects of the 
trade growth using an applied general equilibrium model WorldScan. It shows that GDP could 
be raised by 0.3 to 0.7 percent and consumption by 0.5 to 1.2 percent in the European Union as 
a whole. These results could only be realised if the Services Directive is implemented including 
the country of origin principle. If this principle is excluded from the directive, trade increases 
only by 20 to 40 percent. The trade-induced welfare effects are correspondingly lower. GDP 
could rise by 0.2 to 0.4 percent and consumption by 0.3 to 0.7 percent in the EU as a whole. 
The country-specific effects vary: most of the new Member States will experience larger gains 
than the average Member State because their services trade is now still hampered by relatively 
large regulatory barriers in these countries. 
 
Key words: Services Directive, trade, internal market EU, country of origin principle  
 
JEL code: F12, F15, L51, L8 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
De intra-Europese handel in commerciële diensten kan met 30 tot 60 procent toenemen als de 
dienstenrichtlijn wordt geïmplementeerd zoals die door de Europese Commissie is voorgesteld. 
Dit document analyseert de welvaartseffecten van deze handelstoename gebruikmakend van het 
algemeen evenwichtsmodel WorldScan. Het laat zien dat het BBP in de Europese Unie met 0,3 
tot 0,7 procent kan toenemen en consumptie met 0,5 tot 1,2 procent. Deze resultaten kunnen 
gerealiseerd worden als de dienstenrichtlijn inclusief het land van oorsprongbeginsel wordt 
geïmplementeerd. Als dit principe uit de dienstenrichtlijn wordt gehaald neemt de handel maar 
met 20 tot 40 procent toe. De welvaartseffecten van die handelstoename zijn dan ook kleiner. 
Het BBP in de EU kan met 0,2 tot 0,4 procent toenemen en consumptie met 0,3 tot 0,7 procent. 
De landspecifieke effecten variëren: voor de meeste nieuwe lidstaten zijn de handels- en 
welvaartseffecten groter dan gemiddeld omdat hun dienstenhandel nu nog gehinderd wordt door 
relatief veel regulering.  
 
Steekwoorden: Dienstenrichtlijn, handel, interne markt, land van oorsprongbeginsel  
 
Een uitgebreide Nederlandse samenvatting is beschikbaar via www.cpb.nl.  
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Preface 
In 2004, the European Commission proposed a directive to liberalise trade in services within the 
European Union. In most services sectors, less than 5 percent of production is exported to other 
countries. This is at least partly caused by trade costs resulting from a myriad of regulatory 
barriers. Previous CPB research (The free movement of services within the EU, CPB Document 
69) concluded that the Services Directive could increase trade in commercial services by 30 to 
62 percent and foreign direct investment by 20 to 35 percent within the EU. The present CPB 
Document builds upon these results. CPB’s general equilibrium model for the world economy, 
WorldScan, is used to analyse the welfare effects of the trade increase induced by the Services 
Directive. The model is amended with imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale. 
The results show that the proposed directive increases trade, consumption and production of 
commercial services within the EU. The size of the effects is significantly affected by the 
country of origin principle. This principle is a key element of the original proposal of the 
European Commission but it is heavily debated in Europe. It states that Member States are not 
allowed to regulate their services imports on top of the regulation already imposed by the 
exporting country. If this principle is eliminated from the proposed directive, the effects of the 
amended directive are still substantial, but significantly smaller than in case the country of 
origin principle is implemented. 
 
Roland de Bruijn, Henk Kox, and Arjan Lejour have written this report. Ali Aouragh, Nico van 
Leeuwen, and Gerard Verweij provided valuable research assistance in delivering the data and 
the modelling work. The authors benefited from comments by their CPB colleagues George 
Gelauff, Hugo Rojas-Romagosa, and Paul Veenendaal. 
 
Casper van Ewijk, 
deputy director CPB  ii | 
Summary 
In March 2004, the European Commission proposed a directive on the internal market in 
services. Its aim is to boost the EU's internal market in services by reducing regulation-based 
impediments to trade and investment in services. A previous CPB study The free movement of 
services within the EU concluded that bilateral trade in commercial services may increase by 
30-60 per cent. This equals an increase of total intra-EU trade (i.e. including trade in goods) of 
2 to 5 per cent. For foreign direct investment in commercial services the EU proposal may lead 
to an increase by 20 per cent to 35 per cent.  
 
The present study adds to the previous analysis in two ways. First, it assesses the welfare effects 
of trade growth in commercial services induced by the directive. We use our general-
equilibrium model WorldScan to analyse the welfare effects for the various Member states and 
economic sectors if the trade growth is realised. Second, it analyses separately the role of the 
country of origin principle (CoOP). This is a key element of the proposed directive but it is 
heavily debated. The principle states that a service provider has to meet the standards set by 
regulation of the country of origin, but that he may no longer be confronted by additional 
regulation in the EU country where the service is delivered. The present paper also examines 
the trade effects and accompanying welfare effects of the Services Directive if the country of 
origin principle is eliminated from the proposed directive.  
The trade effects of the Services Directive are derived in lowering the trade-hampering country 
differences in the way services markets are regulated. We have assessed to what extent policy 
heterogeneity would be reduced if the directive was implemented. Based upon the empirical 
relation between bilateral trade in services and the heterogeneity indicators we assessed that 
services trade could increase by 30 to 60 percent within the EU. The present paper also 
investigates the impact of the CoOP on intra-EU services trade. We conclude that the role of 
CoOP is substantial: without CoOP intra-EU services trade could increase by 20 to 40 percent. 
The principle contributes for about a third to the trade-effects of the directive. 
The next step is to assess the general equilibrium effects of the increase in intra-EU other 
commercial services trade, including and excluding the country of origin principle, using CPB’s 
general equilibrium model WorldScan. Reductions in non-tariff barriers are used to mimic the 
trade increases induced by the Services Directive. These reductions are carefully calibrated 
using the Armington demand functions in order to simulate the ex ante trade increases 
precisely.  
 
The model results show that GDP could be raised by 0.3 to 0.7 percent, and consumption by 0.5 
to 1.2 percent in the European Union as a whole. This GDP increase adds 32 to 74 billion euros | iii 
to Europe’s economy based on EU’s GDP in 2004. These results could only be realised if the 
Services Directive is implemented including the country of origin principle. Without the 
principle, the welfare effects of the induced trade growth are correspondingly lower: GDP could 
rise by 0.2 to 0.4 percent and consumption by 0.3 to 0.7 per cent in the EU as a whole. 
 
The country-specific effects vary: most of the new Member States will experience large gains 
because services trade is still hampered by relatively large regulatory barriers in these countries. 
Most of these countries import more services, and specialise in manufacturing. This shift to 
manufacturing is due changes in specialisation patterns in providing other commercial services 
within Europe. The new Member states are not competitive in providing these services. Some 
older Member States like the Netherlands, Germany, Ireland and Austria do experience larger 
than average production and consumption increases. To some extent this is due to specialisation 
in the providing other commercial services, but the effects are also affected by large decreases 
in heterogeneity in regulation with the most important trading partners in other commercial 
services.| 1 
1 Introduction 
The service sector is by far the largest economic sector in the European union (EU). It accounts 
for about two-third of all output and employment. The role of services in intra-EU trade is 
however much smaller. Measured as a share of intra-EU trade, it is only about 20%.
1 There are 
good reasons to argue that services are less tradable than goods, because most services are 
intangible and the provision of services needs the proximity of providers and consumer. 
However, service providers often experience obstacles if they want to export their services to 
other EU member states, or when they want to start a subsidiary company in other EU member 
states. The EC (2002) has concluded that these impediments are to a considerable degree caused 
by national regulations for service exporters, for foreign investment in services and for the 
service product itself. Such regulations are primarily established for domestic purposes without 
taking account of the interests of foreign service providers. 
In 2004 the European Commission (EC, 2004) proposed a directive to reduce the 
impediments for trade in commercial services. A key element of this directive is the ‘country of 
origin’ principle. A service provider who complies with the national regulation of the country of 
origin should no longer −except for a few explicitly named derogatory issues− be hampered by 
regulation in the destination country. The directive facilitates also the establishment of foreign 
subsidiaries by service firms by introducing a single point of contact in each member state, i.e. a 
single "desk" where the foreign service providers can fulfil all their administrative and 
regulatory obligations. It also aims to eliminate unnecessary and discriminatory regulation such 
as nationality and residence restrictions. The proposed EU directive takes a “horizontal” 
approach. The same principles apply to a wide range of different EU service sectors, ranging 
from retail trade to business services, from courier services to construction, from tourism 
services to commercial medical services. It may have a large impact on the European service 
economy. The proposed measures could boost bilateral service trade between EU member states 
by 30 to 60% and intra-EU direct investment in services by 20% to 35%.
2 
The directive is heavily debated. The European Parliament discussed about 1600 
amendments to the proposal and governments of several Members States oppose some elements 
of the proposed directive. The counter arguments vary. Some countries and labour unions fear 
job losses, others fear the lack of national control over vital public services sectors, like medical 
care and education. Others argue that the country of origin principle will lead to a race of 
lowering services standards and of less quality. Acceptance of the country of origin principle 
requires mutual trust in national standards of regulating services. From the debate it becomes 
clear that some opponents to the original proposal want to keep national control over the 
provision of services which could be a reason to skip the country of origin principle.  
 
1 See Kox et al. (2004b) and Voigt (2005). 
2 See Kox et al. (2004a). 2 | 
This document examines the economic effects of the Services Directive including and 
excluding the country of origin principle. Previous work (Kox et al., 2004a) concluded that 
bilateral trade in other commercial services may increase by 30-60 per cent.
3 For foreign direct 
investment in other commercial services the EU proposal may lead to an increase by 20 per cent 
to 35 per cent. This assessment was based on an analysis of the original proposal including the 
country of origin principle. Here we assess the trade effects of the country of origin principle 
separately.  
Section 2 is devoted to this topic. Next we focus on the trade-induced welfare effects of the 
Services Directive. We use our general equilibrium model of the world economy: WorldScan as 
tool for the analysis.
4 The model does not contain a full description of the role of foreign direct 
investment at the moment. Therefore we concentrate on the effects induced by trade impetus of 
the Services Directive. 
Section 4 analyses the effects on production, consumption, trade, wages, and the structure of 
the economy. It concludes that GDP in the EU as a whole can increase by 0.3% to 0.6%, and 
consumption by 0.7% to 1.2% is the directive is completely implemented. The country of origin 
principle contributes for about a third to the production and consumption effects.  
The economic results are the outcome of three effects. First, real trade barriers in services 
are dismantled. This increases the demand for foreign services. Second, lower trade barriers 
induce a positive trade-of-terms effect, and stimulate consumption. Third lower trade barriers 
open the opportunity for improving the allocative efficiency of the services sectors over Europe.  
These three effects  have a different impact on the Member States: most of the new Member 
States will experience large gains because services trade is hampered by relatively large 
regulatory barriers in these countries. Imports in these countries swallow. Also some older 
Member States like the Netherlands, Germany, Ireland and Austria experience larger than 
average production and consumption increases.  In these countries the allocative efficiency 
plays an important role. They specialise in the production of other commercial services, but the 
effects are also affected by the large decrease in heterogeneity in regulation with the most 
important trading partners in other commercial services. 
 
 
3 Other commercial services include all commercial services excluding transport. The reason is that transport is excluded 
from the Services Directive.  
4 See Lejour et al. (2006) for a description. Recently the model is amended with imperfect competition and economies of 
scale, see De Bruijn (2006) for an extensive discussion of this topic.  | 3 
2  Trade effects of the Services Directive 
2.1  Regulation and services trade 
Earlier CPB research has dealt extensively with the possible impacts of the European 
Commission's 2004 proposal for a Services Directive on the intra-European trade and direct 
investment in services.
5 A novelty in this research is the way in which non-tariff barriers in 
services are quantified. The basic idea is that international differences in product-market 
regulation affect trade and investment costs. 
 
Service firms face many obstacles when they want to export their services or when they want to 
set up a local affiliate in other EU member states. The trade barriers to an important degree 
result from national regulations. This affects service firms more than manufacturing firms, 
because the service provider often has to deliver his services close to the foreign consumer, 
meaning that he actually has to work within the country of destination. Service firms exporting 
to other EU member states are thus confronted with all types of national regulations and red 
tape such as special licenses, requirements for additional diplomas, local residence of 
management, local professional insurance, constraints on the use of home country inputs, the 
necessity to fully apply all local labour laws even for temporary services, restrictions on 
marketing, inter-firm cooperation, or the juridical form of the company. Opaque regulations, a 
multiplicity of regulatory agencies, and fuzzy implementation procedures further add to trading 
costs of service providers. 
International differences in product-market regulation cause a duplication of fixed 
qualification and policy-compliance costs for service firms operating across borders with two 
economic consequences.
6 First, it causes additional fixed costs for entering a particular foreign 
market. Secondly, it leads to a loss of potential scale economies. Due to the fact that the fixed 
qualification costs are specific for a national market, the costs cannot be spread out over 
production that is destined for other foreign markets. Regulation heterogeneity restricts the 
realisation of economies of scale in complying with regulations, and it increases costs for 
internationally operating services firms.  
 
The approach adopted by Kox, Lejour and Montizaan (2004a) is to quantify the degree of 
policy heterogeneity between countries. For a set of 184 different comparison items in product-
market regulation they establish bilateral policy heterogeneity between all relevant country 
pairs. The policy data stem from the OECD International Regulation database, which is fed by 
 
5 See in particular, Kox, Lejour and Montizaan (2004a); Kox and Lejour (2005).  
6 Since such fixed costs are often independent of firm size, the heaviest burden of policy heterogeneity falls upon small- and 
medium-size service firms. Qualification costs must be borne up-front by exporting firms, independent of firm size. Small 
firms thus are in a relatively disadvantaged position.  4 | 
information from OECD member governments.
7 The heterogeneity indicator measures per 
comparison item whether two countries have identical regulation or not. When regulation 
differs for an item a value of 1 is assigned, and when there is no difference a value of 0. 
Aggregated over the 184 items, this yields a numerical indicator for bilateral policy 
heterogeneity. A low value indicates little heterogeneity and a high value much heterogeneity. 
The heterogeneity indicator is −following an OECD classification− further decomposed into 
separate indicators for five different areas of product-market regulation. Kox et al. (2004a) have 
used these five sub indicators as independent variables for explaining intra-EU trade through a 
gravity model. The dependent variable is bilateral trade (1999-2001) in 'Other Commercial 
Services' between the 14 'old' members of the European Union.
8 The model explains the 
bilateral trade from the following variables: the distance and differences in languages between 
countries (as a measure of trade costs), GDP in the countries of origin and destination (as a 
measure for market size and scale effects), and regulatory barriers. For the latter Kox et al. 
(2004a) investigate both the impact of the level and the heterogeneity of national product 
market regulations. They correct for unobserved variables in both origin and destination 
country.  
The empirical analysis shows that the level and the heterogeneity of regulation between 
countries have a significant negative effect on bilateral trade in commercial services.
9 Various 
specifications and estimation methods lead to similar results: the intensity of regulation and its 
heterogeneity are variables that significantly affect the volume of trade in commercial services. 
The most important conclusions for the EU14 are: 
•  Heterogeneity in two areas of product market regulation (Barriers to competition and Explicit 
barriers to trade and investment) has a markedly negative impact on trade in commercial 
services. Heterogeneity in Barriers to competition has the largest effect of both.  
•  A high level of domestic regulation has a negative impact on the origin country's services 
exports and a negative impact on service imports from other EU Member States.  
•  Variables for the other components of regulatory heterogeneity have no statistically significant 
impact on commercial service trade.  
 
 
7 The database builds on the path-breaking data work by a team of OECD researchers (cf. Nicoletti et al. 2000). The base 
year is 1998. In the mean time, an updated version has been published for the year 2003 (cf. Conway et al. 2005).  
8 Belgium and Luxembourg are aggregated because their trade data are combined. Data for the new Member States were 
not available at that point in time. A more recent OECD database also contains trade data for Poland, Czech Republic, and 
Hungary. 
9 The OECD data for trade in commercial services includes Trade and Distribution, Business Services, Hotels and 
Restaurants, Personal Services, Construction, and Financial Services. We do not consider Transport services and Travel 
services, since they are not covered by the EU directive, and because they differ with regard to non-tariff barriers (cf. Kox, 
Lejour and Montizaan, 2004a: Ch.4).  | 5 
Table 2.1 presents the estimated heterogeneity-related parameters. The indicators for bilateral 
policy heterogeneity in these two areas have been used for simulating the trade impacts of the 
Services Directive. 
 
2.2  The European Commission's 2004 proposal for a Services Directive 
The European Commission aims at completing the European Single Market by extending its 
domain to the service sector. This is the overriding goal of the ambitious and far-reaching 
proposal for a Services Directive (EC, 2004).
10 This directive wants to eliminate the obstacles to 
the freedom of establishment, to eliminate the obstacles to the free movement of services, and 
to establish mutual trust between the EU countries on their regulatory regimes. The proposed 
directive can be interpreted as a general framework that involves all economic activities 
regarding service trade, though subject to some exceptions.
 The proposed measures force the 
member states to simplify their regulatory procedures, to eliminate regulations that restrict 
service trade, to guarantee the free movement of services from other member states and to 
evaluate the proportionality and justification of a number of requirements and the compatibility 
with EU directives. The most important elements of the Services Directive are:  
•  Prohibition of restrictive legal requirements. This holds for discriminatory requirements 
directly or indirectly based on nationality or residence. Restrictive requirements such as the 
prohibitions to establish in more than one member state or to enter the register of professional 
bodies or associations in more than one member state are also banned. Also prohibited will be 
the use of economic criteria for establishment or the involvement of competing operators in the 
 
10 The directive is still a proposal by the European Commission. The European Parliament will in February 2006 vote on the 
proposed directive and the amendments. Later in 2006 the European Council will discuss the amended form of the proposal.  
Table 2.1  Values of the estimated parameters for policy heterogeneity variables, explaining bilateral trade 
in services (OCS), 14 EU countries, 1999-2001 




Regulation regarding barriers for competition  − 3.10  5.64*
Explicit regulatory barriers to trade and investment  − 0.86  2.87*
Regulatory and administrative opacity  − 0.23   0.70 
Administrative barriers for start-up firms   0.35  0.97 
Regulation regarding government involvement and state control  0.74  1.28 
a)
 Asterisk denotes 1% confidence interval (two-tailed) of the estimates. The two heterogeneity parameters for which this holds have 
been used for simulating the trade impact of the Service Directive. 
Source: Kox, Lejour and Montizaan (2004a) 6 | 
granting of authorisation, or the obligation to provide a financial guarantee. Other national 
requirements (quantitative or territorial restrictions, obligations of certain legal form of 
holdings, requirements to the share holding of providers, the number of establishments in one 
country or the number of employees) have to be evaluated on the compatibility with EU 
directives.  
•  Measures for eliminating obstacles to the free movement of services. A major element here is 
the ‘country of origin’ principle, implying that a provider is only subject to the law of the 
country in which he is established (Section 2.2 will separately deal with this element that is of 
special relevance for intra-EU service trade). On the service demand side, the proposed 
directive establishes the right of persons and firms to use services from other Member States 
without being hindered by restrictive measures or discriminating behaviour from their own 
government. The directive asks for a national system for providing assistance to customers who 
use a service provided by an operator in another member state. The directive allocates the tasks 
between Member State of origin and of destination in the case of posting workers for provision 
of services.  
•  The proposals include several elements that will help eliminating the obstacles to the freedom of 
service providers to establish themselves in other Member States.
11  
•  Measures for establishing mutual trust between countries consist of the harmonisation of 
legislation in order to guarantee equivalent protection of the general interest on essential issues 
such as consumer protection.
12 
 
The proposals apply to a large part of the EU services sector, ranging from retail distribution to 
marketing research, from administration firms to certified accountants, from funeral services to 
engineering consultants, from medical services to construction. However the sectors that will be 
most affected are: Distribution, Business Services, Hotel and Restaurant services, Construction, 
and Courier Services. Commercial services sectors not covered by the directive are: Financial 
Services, Transport, Telecommunications, and Energy.  
 
11 These elements include: administrative simplification measures like a the introduction per country of a ‘single point of 
contact’ where service providers can complete their administrative procedures; the use of electronic procedures for fulfilling 
administrative requirements; principles that must be respected by national authorisation schemes applicable to services; 
prohibition of certain restrictive legal requirements; and the obligation to assess the compatibility of certain national legal 
requirements with EU directives. 
12 This includes provider’s obligations on information, professional insurance, settlement of disputes, and exchange of 
information on the quality of the provider. The directive asks for stronger mutual assistance between national authorities in 
order to promote effective supervision of services on basis of a clear division of tasks between the Member States. Other 
elements are the promotion of service quality by voluntary certification of activities, the possible cooperation between 
chambers of commerce, and the encouragement codes of conduct drawn up by interested parties at Community level.  | 7 
Impact on regulatory heterogeneity 
Most of the proposed measures must lead to reduced policy heterogeneity, a lower level of 
regulation, more transparent and less complex regulation for service providers that wish to 
operate in other EU Member States. For the full range of 184 policy items that have been used 
for calculating policy heterogeneity indices, Kox, Lejour and Montizaan (2004a) estimate the 
impact of the EU proposals on intra-EU regulation heterogeneity. They assess at detailed level 
per regulation item how it is likely to be affected (heavily, moderately, not affected) by the 
proposed EU directive. This information is aggregated into the overall effects of the EU 
measures on each of the heterogeneity indicators for sub-domains of product-market regulation. 
Table 2.2 gives the results, showing the expected reduction by sub-domain of product-market 
regulation. Because of the uncertain impact of the EU directive on some regulatory comparison 
items - in particular for those items that are partially affected - we use a bandwidth indicating 
minimum and maximum effect. The table shows that the heterogeneity components Regulatory 
and administrative opacity and Explicit barriers to trade and investment are heavily affected by 
the EU directive. The heterogeneity components Administrative burdens for start-ups and 
Barriers to competition are moderately affected by the EU directive and the component State 
control is hardly affected. The state control regulation items mainly relate to network sectors, 
and the latter are not included in the proposed EU directive. The impact percentages in 
Table 2.2 are used to assess the impact of the Services Directive on regulation heterogeneity 
and, hence, on trade in services between Member States.  
Table 2.2     Expected impacts of proposed EU measures on intra-EU policy heterogeneity, by sub-domain 
Components of heterogeneity indicator  
and covered policy domains  
 Average bilateral heterogeneity 




to implementation of the EU 
directive 
b) 
Regulatory and administrative opacity   0.38 66 − 77 % 
Explicit barriers to trade and investment  0.21 73 − 78 % 
Administrative burdens on start-ups   0.55 34 − 46 % 
Barriers to competition   0.32 29 − 37 % 
State control   0.42 3 −  6 % 
Overall PMR heterogeneity indicator  0.39  31 − 38 % 
 
a)
 Excluding Luxembourg due to insufficient data. Zero represents no heterogeneity, and one maximum heterogeneity. 
b)
 Based on detailed item-wise consideration of the match between the EU directive and the 184 specific regulation items selected from 
the OECD database.  
Source: Kox, Lejour and Montizaan (2004a) 
 
The country-of-origin principle (CoOP) is perhaps the most debated single element of the 
Commission's 2004 proposal for a Services Directive. We investigate separately what impact 
the removal of the CoOP could have on intra-EU policy heterogeneity, and hence, on intra-EU 
trade in services.  8 | 
2.3 The  Country-of-Origin  Principle 
The country-of-origin principle forms a key provision in the European Commission proposal for 
a Services Directive (EC 2004). It allows an EU-based service provider to operate elsewhere in 
the Union if it meets the regulatory requirements in its home location. The text box on the next 
page presents the essentials of the country-of-origin principle in the Services Directive.  
Governments have two basic mechanisms for reducing the costs of regulation heterogeneity 
for internationally operating firms, namely by regulation harmonisation, or by allowing foreign 
firms to operate under regulatory standards of their home country (mutual recognition). 
Harmonisation of regulation is a very long process, and it may not be efficient because 
countries may have different market preconditions or different regulatory preferences. This 
means that a wider application of the mutual-recognition principle may be the most auspicious 
track. Reducing regulation heterogeneity could be done by applying more mutual recognition 
with regard to qualification standards for service providers. This indeed is the approach that has 
been chosen by the European Commission in its 'country of origin' principle. It allows for more 
mutual recognition of regulatory regimes in the European service markets. A service provider 
that meets the regulatory standards in the member state of origin should no longer be confronted 
by other or additional regulatory requirements in the EU country where the service is delivered.  
The country of origin principle (CoOP) applies only in the case of cross-border provision of 
services without establishment. If a service provider has an establishment, he is entirely subject 
to the law of that country. A service provider who wants to deliver his services in other Member 
States without a permanent presence there, has to comply only with the administrative and legal 
requirements of his country of establishment. Since the CoOP is combined with a number of 
explicit derogations
13 the individual service provider will have the certainty that outside the 
derogations he has to comply only with his own law.  
The implication of the CoOP is that the wide diversity of national rules and standards would 
cease to be a major obstacle to services suppliers trading in other member states. The CoOP 
respects that individual EU member states have different preferences for the level of regulation 
of their service industries. However, for imported services they are asked to apply mutual 
recognition of regulatory regimes in other member states.  
 
 
13 A short summary can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/services/docs/services-dir/guides/cop_en.pdf | 9 
The country-of-origin (CoOP) principle  
The country-of-origin principle is formulated in article 16 of the proposed Services Directive (EC 2004): 
 “Member States shall ensure that providers are subject to only the national provisions of their Member State of origin 
which fall in the coordinated field. [... This] shall cover national provisions relating to access to and the exercise of a 
service activity, in particular those requirements governing the behaviour of the provider, the quality or content of the 
service, advertising, contracts and the provider’s liability.” 
 
Member States may not, for reasons falling within the coordinated field, restrict the freedom to provide services in the 
case of a provider established in another Member State, in particular, by imposing any of the following requirements: 
   (a) an obligation on the provider to have an establishment in their territory; 
   (b) an obligation on the provider to make a declaration or notification to, or to obtain an authorisation from their 
competent authorities, including entry in a register or registration with a professional body or association in their territory; 
   (c) an obligation on the provider to have an address or representative in their territory or to have an address for 
service at the address of a person authorised in their country; 
   (d) a ban on the provider setting up a certain infrastructure in their territory, including an office or chambers, which the 
provider needs to supply the services in question; 
   (e) an obligation on the provider to comply with requirements relating to the exercise of a service activity applicable in 
their country; 
   (f) the application of specific contractual arrangements between the provider and the recipient which prevent or restrict 
service provision by the self-employed; 
   (g) an obligation on the provider to possess an identity document issued by its competent authorities specific to the 
exercise of a service activity; 
   (h) requirements which affect the use of equipment which is an integral part of the service provided; 
   (i) restrictions on the freedom to provide the services referred to in Article [..., mainly tax-deductable services, certain 
refunded health-care activities, service activities done by posted third-country nationals]. 
 
The country-of-origin principle holds for a broad range of services, unless they fall under one of the explicitly mentioned 
derogations or exemptions. General derogations apply for services that are already regulated under other EU directives 
or form part of explicitly listed services. The latter include inter alia most network services (postal services, distribution of 
gas, water and electricity); intellectual property rights; acts requiring by law the involvement of a notary; statutory audits; 
services that are generally restricted in a country for reasons of public policy, public security, environment or public 
health; authorisation system for hospital care. All matters covered by the Directive on Posted Workers (such as 
minimum wages, working time, safety, hygiene and safety standards…) are excluded from the country-of-origin 
principle. This concerns working conditions laid down both by law and by collective agreements. Service providers must 
thus respect working conditions in the MS where they post workers and the authorities of that MS must control the 
compliance with those. (Art. 17.5, 24.1).  
 
 
The status of the CoOP in the proposed Services Directive  
The Services Directive has been prepared through a one-year consultation period with all EU 
member states. There was general agreement as to the objectives of the proposed Services 
Directive. However, in the half year after the publication of the proposals in march 2004 (EU 
2004), some public unrest and debate arose on the potential social and economic effects of the 
proposed directive. An important element in this debate was the country-of -origin principle. 
Member-state ministers during the EU Competitiveness Council on 25 November 2004 10 | 
expressed concerns about a number of issues. In this first debate on the subject, ministers 
focused on three main issues: the CoOP, co-operation between national authorities and the 
simplification of administrative procedures. Especially the CoOP appeared to be a controversial 
issue. Six member states said to be opposed to the principle that service providers should be 
subject to the laws of their home country rather than of the country where the service is 
provided. Such concerns inter alia referred to cross-border provision of health services. 
In March 2005, EU Commissioner McCreevy in a speech to the European Parliament (EP) 
noted: "After my initial round of contacts I went to President Barroso and said that I believed 
the current proposal would never be adopted unless we were prepared to accept modifications". 
He subsequently identified the following point for revision:
14 
 
•  "The Directive will have to be clear that conditions and standards for workers will not be 
affected in any way. The text will have to be watertight on this point."  
•  "The exclusion from the scope of the Directive of sectors such as health and publicly funded 
services of general interest." 
•  "We should address concerns about the operation of the country of origin principle: We need to 
maintain this if we want to promote the cross-frontier provision of services. To do so we will 
need to address key issues such as giving greater confidence and certainty to businesses and 
consumers on what law will apply to cross-border transactions. We also need to build the trust 
and confidence between Member States necessary for it to operate effectively". 
On 22 November 2005, an important vote took place in the Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection (IMCO) Committee of the European Parliament (EP).
15 The Committee voted at first 
reading on the report about the proposed Services Directive, tabled by EP reporter Gebhardt. 
Over 1600 EP-amendments were proposed. Many amendments were approved or rejected by a 
narrow majority, whereas compromised and consolidated amendments were jointly supported 
by the major political groups.  
The MEPs could not agree on the CoOP. With regard to the CoOP, Gebhardt had proposed to 
distinguish the right to provide cross-border services from the practical exercise of this right. 
The right to exercise a service activity would − in her proposal− be acquired by the provider in 
his country of origin, i.e. his country of establishment. But the provision of a service in another 
Member State (the host country) would be subject to the legislation of that State. However, the 
IMCO Committee voted (by 21 votes to 16, with 3 abstentions) in favour of a solution close to 
the Commission’s initial proposal. Healthcare services will not fall within the remit of the 
Services Directive if the text of the IMCO Committee is approved by the European Parliament’s 
 
14 C. McCreevy , Statement to the European Parliament on Services Directive, European Parliament Plenary Session, 
Strasbourg, 8 March 2005 
15 See report http://www.europarl.eu.int/news/expert/infopress_page/056-2690-326-11-47-909-20051118IPR02599-22-11-
2005-2005--false/default_en.htm | 11 
plenary session and by the European Council later on. The MEPS want a clarification of the 
relation between the Services Directive and other pieces of EU legislation, such as the Directive 
on Posting of Workers: the other legislation should always prevail over the Services Directive 
according to the revised MEP text. Moreover, they agreed that the member state of destination 
(rather than that of origin) should be responsible for supervising the activity of a foreign service 
provider in its territory. The MEPs are planning to vote on the text in the Plenary Session in 
February 2006.  
Although the European Commission’s initial CoOP proposals are heavily criticised, these 
proposals are also supported by large groups. An economic assessment of the CoOP could 
contribute to this debate. 
Impact of the CoOP on policy heterogeneity 
Using the same approach as for Table 2.2 we have assessed what specifically the impact of the 
CoOP is on intra-EU heterogeneity in product-market regulation. Table 2.3 concludes that the 
CoOP has its strongest impact on intra-EU policy heterogeneity with regard to Regulatory and 
administrative opacity, the area of Explicit barriers to Trade and investment, and the area of 
Barriers to competition. As shown in Table 2.1, heterogeneity in the latter two areas has a 
decisive role as non-tariff barrier for services trade. The removal of the CoOP from the 
proposed Services Directive will therefore hamper intra-EU services trade by leaving much 
policy heterogeneity in the areas of Explicit barriers to Trade and investment, and Barriers to 
competition. 
Table 2.3  Expected impacts of proposed EU measures − with and without the CoOP − on intra-EU policy  
                  heterogeneity, by sub-domain 
Components of heterogeneity indicator 
and covered policy domains  
   Full implementation of  
   Services Directive  
 Implementation of Services 
















average all EU 
countries 
b) 
Regulatory and administrative opacity   66 − 77 % 0.09 − 0.13 39 − 45 % 0.21 − 0.23 
Explicit barriers to trade and investment  72 − 79 % 0.05 − 0.06 41 − 45 % 0.12 − 0.12 
Administrative burdens on start-ups   34 − 46 % 0.30 − 0.36 34 − 45 % 0.30 − 0.36 
Barriers to competition   29 − 37 % 0.20 − 0.23 19 − 25 % 0.24 − 0.26 
State control   3 −   6 % 0.39 − 0.41 3  −  6 % 0.39 − 0.41 
Overall PMR heterogeneity    31 − 38 % 0.24 − 0.27 22 − 27 % 0.28 − 0.30 
 
a)
 Based on detailed item-wise consideration of the match between the EU directive and the 184 specific items of product-market 
regulation. 
b)
  Remaining policy heterogeneity is calculated by subtracting the heterogeneity reduction from the initial values in Table 2.2.  
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Other results are that the CoOP has hardly any influence on intra-EU policy heterogeneity with 
regard to State control items. This is not strange since most of the network sectors (where state 
involvement often is considerable) are excluded form the directive. The CoOP also has hardly 
any impact on intra-EU policy heterogeneity with regard to Administrative burdens on start-up 
firms. This policy area is mainly related to the establishment of new local firms, a domain 
where the CoOP does not apply.  
2.4  Possible impacts of the EU proposals on services trade 
Using the results of the empirical gravity analysis (cf. Table 2.1) and the quantification of the 
heterogeneity impact of the Services Directive (Table 2.3) we have simulated how the proposed 
measures could affect intra-EU trade in services. Note that although the parameters in Table 2.1 
are estimated for the EU14, we have used the estimation results also for the new Member States 
Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. The data of the OECD International Regulatory database 
also permitted us to construct regulatory heterogeneity indices for Poland, Czech Republic and 
Hungary as bilateral trade partner. We used this information to estimate the bilateral trade 
increases with respect to these countries. 
We account for two types of uncertainty: the statistical uncertainty of the parameter 
estimates, and some uncertainties about the eventual effects of the Services Directive on the 
actual policy heterogeneity. With respect to the latter we use the bandwidth on the expected 
impact of the EU directive on the heterogeneity indicators presented in Table 2.3. The statistical 
uncertainty in parameters (cf. Table 2.1) is taken into account by using a spread of the estimated 
parameter plus and minus its standard error. On this basis Table 2.4 presents a bandwidth in the 
possible effects: a minimum, a central, and a maximum effect. The central effect is calculated 
by using the parameter estimates and the middle of the bandwidth on the expected impact of the 
directive on regulatory heterogeneity. The minimum (maximum) effect is estimated using the 
values of the parameter estimates minus (plus) a standard error and taking the minimum 
(maximum) value of the bandwidth in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.4  Simulation effects: Impact of proposed Services Directive (with and without the CoOP) on intra-
EU bilateral trade in services (in %) 
  Minimum Central Maximum 
Effects for total intra-EU trade in Other Commercial Services, Directive 
without CoOP 
19 28 38 
Effects for total intra-EU trade in Other Commercial Services, full 
implementation of Directive  
30 44 62 
Difference  − 11 − 16  − 24 
  (= − 36%)   
Effects are derived from the parameter estimates in Table 2.1 and the reduction in heterogeneity (Table 2.3). Kox et al. (2004a) presents 
the details of this analysis.  | 13 
The trade effects differ substantially by country.  In the case of the maximum effect: 
•  The new Member States, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary will at least double their intra-
EU trade. 
•  Greece and Portugal could expect a doubling of intra-EU service exports; 
•  Four countries may gain between 70 and 90 per cent (Austria, Italy, Spain, and Denmark); 
•  Six countries may gain between 58 and 70 per cent on intra-EU services exports: Germany, the 
UK, France, Sweden, Finland, Ireland; 
•  Belgium-Luxemburg and the Netherlands could increase trade by about 50%. 
 
This variation between countries does also appear for the minimum effect case and for the case 
in which CoOP is excluded from the directive.
16 A decomposition analysis of the effects of the 
CoOP is shown in Table 2.5 for the EU15 as a whole. Most of the trade effects stems from the 
way the CoOP is expected to lower the role of heterogeneity in Barriers to competition.  
Table 2.5  Decomposing the trade effects of removing CoOP from Services Directive (in %)  
  Minimum  Central   Maximum  
Total difference   − 11 − 16 
a)
  − 24 
of which:    
Less reduction heterogeneity in Barriers to competition  − 13       
Less reduction heterogeneity in Explicit barriers to trade  − 4       
a)
 includes rounding error. 
 
We conclude from this analysis that the CoOP contributes significantly to the development of 
intra-EU trade if the Services Directive is implemented .  
 
 
16 Annex 1 presents a full matrix on the trade increases for all bilateral other commercial services trade flows.  14 | 
3  WorldScan and the baseline 
We want to evaluate the economic effects of the trade stimulus induced by the Services 
Directive with and without the country of origin principle. The increase in trade will affect trade 
and production patterns, consumption and prices. The sector other commercial services will be 
most affected but changes in the demand for factor inputs, and shift in the provision of 
commercial services in Europe will also affect other economic sectors. We address these effects 
in an applied general equilibrium model, WorldScan.  
The model takes account of several welfare effects. One is the effect on producers. In some 
cases, domestic service producers will be affected positively due to more export possibilities. 
Less competitive domestic producers will see their profits affected in a negative way. The 
balance between these two groups of producers will differ among the EU countries. Second, 
more competition lowers prices, and brings more variety. This will enlarge the consumer 
surplus, and thus benefit domestic consumers in most EU countries. Also producers can benefit. 
Since a number of the service sectors involved are providers of intermediate inputs, more EU-
wide competition will lower intermediate unit input prices and thus make the client industries 
more competitive.  
The welfare effects described above are generally positive for the EU as a whole. The 
country-specific effects will vary. The model takes also account of sectoral production and 
employment shifts. The direction of these shifts determines whether a country will benefit form 
implementing the Services Directive. 
Characteristics of the model 
WorldScan is an applied general equilibrium model for the world economy. The model was 
developed in the nineties for CPB’s earlier scenario study Scanning the Future (1992). The 
model has thereafter often been used for scenario studies, analyses of climate-change policies 
and trade policies. The current version of the model has been substantially revised and it is 
much better underpinned empirically.
17 
The model version used in this paper distinguishes 10 goods and services markets, a labour 
market, and a capital market for each of the 23 countries and regions (see Annex 2). All EU 
countries are modelled separately, except for Belgium and Luxembourg and the three Baltic 
States, Cyprus and Malta. Moreover, we distinguish the United States, Rest OECD, and Rest of 
the world. We distinguish 10 sectors: agriculture, energy (primary energy and electricity), four 
manufacturing sectors (high, high-medium, low-medium and low technology), three services 
sectors (transport, other commercial and other) and a R&D sector.  
There are 10 types of producers, each of which produces one type of good or service. We 
call this a sector. All goods are produced by using labour, capital, R&D and intermediate inputs, 
albeit in different proportions. The relative demand for each of these inputs depends on the 
characteristics of the sectoral production function. In general, we assume that labour and capital 
 
17 See Lejour et al. (2006) for an up-to-date publication.  | 15 
are good substitutes. We consider the various intermediate inputs as good substitutes, but there 
are hardly any substitution possibilities between the intermediate inputs, on the one hand, and 
capital, labour and R&D, on the other hand. 
 Scale economies are modelled through a decreasing average cost curve caused by a fixed 
set-up cost for firms. Firms cover this fixed cost by setting a mark-up on their marginal cost. 
We assume a large number of firms with identical technology within a sector. Each firm 
produces a specific variety. Firms have market power, since consumers prefer different 
varieties. There is free entry and exit at each market until profits and losses are vanished. Every 
firm produces just as much to cover fixed costs by the mark up. Because production per firm is 
fixed , production per sector increases only if the number of firms increases. Hence, the number 
of varieties increases which induces a positive welfare effect. For more details on the 
description of scale economies and monopolistic competition, see De Bruijn (2006). 
Consumers demand the various goods and services, and provide labour and capital to the 
firms. They consume goods and services in different proportions, depending on their prices and 
the income elasticities of these goods and services. We assume that the supply of labour is 
exogenous. Because consumers save part of their income, they are able to supply capital to 
firms in return for non-wage income. Savings depend on income growth and demographic 
characteristics. In the OECD countries, demography mainly concerns ageing within the 
population, which reduces savings. 
Consumers supply capital and firms demand it. Equilibrium between demand and supply 
determines the price of capital.
18 In contrast to the labour market, regional capital markets are 
assumed to be linked to each other. So if capital is abundant in one region (and thus is relatively 
inexpensive), it is invested in another region in which capital is scarce (capital is expensive). 
However, there are some barriers to investing abroad. Therefore, interregional capital mobility 
reduces, but does not eliminate, capital price differentials between regions. In the latter case we 
would have one global capital market.  
The regional goods and services markets are linked to each other, except for the R&D 
sector. Not only the home market, but also foreign markets determine demand for a good. Each 
region produces a different bundle of varieties of that good. Because we distinguish 23 regions, 
there are 23 bundles of varieties for each of the 9 non-R&D sectors. In principle, consumers and 
producers demand all these different bundles. The demand for each of the varieties depends on 
its relative price, the substitution possibilities between the varieties, transportation costs, trade 
barriers and preferences for the variety. If the price of a particular variety goes up, demand will 
decrease in favour of other varieties. Hence, total demand for each variety depends on the 
demand on the home and foreign markets. 
 
 
18 Actually, the price of capital is a function of the investment price times the sum of the real interest rate and depreciation 
rate. 16 | 
Baseline path 
We evaluate the impact of the Services Directive in comparison to a baseline simulation in 
which the directive is not implemented. The baseline describes a time path of economic 
developments from today to 2040, the final year of our simulations. The differences between 
the policy variant simulation and the baseline represent the effects of implementing the Services 
Directive. 
The baseline complies with recent economic developments. The starting year of our 
simulations is 2001, because that is the latest year for which data are available to calibrate the 
model: GTAP data base, version 6 (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2005). The time path between 
2001 and 2004 has to include the accession of the new member states to the internal market. 
Moreover, we expect some catching up of these countries towards the old ones. Second, the 
baseline has to be neutral with respect to the implementation of the policy variants. This means 
that we aim at moderate economic growth within the EU in the baseline.  
Taking in mind these considerations, our baseline is based on one of our long-term scenarios 
for Europe. In 2003 CPB has developed four long-term scenarios of the European economy.
19 
As a starting point for our baseline we chose the Strong Europe scenario.
20 In this scenario 
economic growth in Europe is moderate. Below we describe some of the characteristics of the 
baseline. 
Population grows hardly within the EU due to aging: population growth declines in time 
from 0.35% per year to zero. In the Central and Eastern European countries population will 
diminish. The population projections are derived from Eurostat (2002) for the EU. GDP growth 
slightly decreases over time due to the decline in population growth. GDP growth per capita is 
more or less constant. Between 2001 and 2003 GDP growth is targeted on actual numbers of the 
World Bank (2004). From 2004 onwards we assume a constant growth of total factor 
productivity. This leads to a GDP per capita growth rate within the EU of about 1.9%.
21 In most 
new EU member states on average growth is about 2% points higher. In time participation rates 
decline, because people become older. Therefore employment growth falls over time, on 
average by 0.3% in the EU. Exports grow slightly faster than GDP. We do not incorporate 
further trade liberalisation and trade facilitation induced by WTO agreements or an improved 
functioning of the internal market in the EU.
22  
Table 3.1 presents the sectoral structure for the EU economy in 2001. This gives a good 
indication of the general pattern in the economy, although the numbers will differ at the level of 
 
19 See De Mooij and Tang (2003) for a motivation, derivation, and qualitative description of the scenarios, and Lejour (2003) 
for the quantitative illustration. 
20 This does not imply that we consider the realisation of this scenario more likely than one of the others. We only selected 
this scenario because its characteristics meet the conditions of the baseline in this analysis. We do not implement all 
characteristics of this scenario, so the baseline is not a perfect copy of Strong Europe. 
21 2.0% GDP growth minus 0.1% population growth. 
22 Here we deviate from the Strong Europe scenario which assumes successful trade-liberalisation rounds and a better 
internal market in the EU.  | 17 
the member states. Other commercial services and other services are the largest economic 
sectors in terms of value added and employment. Of the manufacturing sectors, low technology 
and medium-high technology sectors are the largest ones. The first one consists of food 
processing and textiles among others, the latter one consists of machinery and equipment and 
chemicals. 
The manufacturing sectors are much more open in terms of export ratios (exports divided by 
production) than the other sectors. In other services, which are mainly government services, 
there is hardly any trade at all. Medium-high tech and high tech manufacturing are much more 
tradable than low tech manufacturing. Medium-high tech manufacturing also provides the 
largest part of total exports. Other important exporting sectors are low tech manufacturing and 
other commercial services, but as a share of production nearly no other commercial services are 
delivered to foreign markets. Transport services are by definition also tradable.  R&D is not 
exported by assumption. Note that trade is restricted to cross-border trade, but includes intra- 
and extra-EU trade . For goods trade this is standard, but for services trade it implies that other 
modes of international transactions in services are not covered here such tourism and business 
travel, provision by foreign affiliates and the activities of individual service providers.
23 
Table 3.1  Sectoral characteristics for the EU as a whole in 2001 
Sectors Employment 
share
Value-added share Export ratio Export share 
Agriculture 4.2 2.5 17.6 2.3 
Energy 1.3 2.1 10.7 1.7 
Low tech manufacturing  8.5 8.1 24.4 16.5 
Medium-low tech manufacturing  4.5 3.8 25.4 8.4 
Medium-high tech manufacturing   9.0 9.4 50.5 42.1 
High tech manufacturing  2.3 1.9 48.9 7.5 
Transport services  4.9 4.1 19.3 5.5 
Other commercial services  38.8 44.3 5.7 12.9 
Research and development  2.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 
Other services  24.5 22.3 0.6 0.5 
Source: own calculations based on GTAP data, 2001. 
All numbers are expressed as ratios. The sectoral shares in employment, value added and exports add up to 100. The export ratio is 
defined as the volume of exports divided by the volume of production.  
 
The EU average hides the country variation. Table 3.2 presents characteristics of the sector 
other commercial services for all Member States. On average this sector contributes for 46% to 
value added in 2040. This varies from 26% in the Czech Republic and Slovenia to more than 
50% in Italy, Germany and Austria. The column with openness indicates that on average 7% of 
the production is exported. In Slovenia, Poland and the Czech Republic it is only 1%. Thee 
countries hardly export services. For the Netherlands en Austria it is about 10%, but for 
 
23 In the GATS terminology,  these numbers only cover trade in mode I. Our analysis is also focussed on trade in mode I.  18 | 
Belgium -Luxembourg it is 22% and for Ireland even 36%. The tradability of commercial 
services in Ireland is to a large extent caused by trade in IT.  
The Balassa index is a measure for specialisation. Numbers exceeding 100 indicates that a 
country exports relatively much commercial services. This indicates that these countries are 
competitive in providing other commercial services. Examples are Austria, Belgium-
Luxembourg, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal and 
Sweden. In particular Austria, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Ireland provide relatively 
much services to other countries. Most of these countries are net exporters. Belgium-
Luxembourg and Ireland are exceptions however. They seem to be specialised according to the 
Balassa index because they export relatively much commercial services as share of their total 
exports than other countries do. They are however  net importers. Both countries export and 
import an exceptionally high share of services. 
Table 3.2  Characteristics other commercial services sector  












EU25 46.1  860.0 922.0 7.3 125.6 
Austria 57.9  35.7 28.2 10.7 207.5 
Belgium-Luxembourg 30.7  55.8 85.2 22.2 133.4 
Czech Republic  26.4  1.3 35.8 1.1 4.7 
Germany 56.1  179.5 107.6 7.4 144.1 
Denmark 33.0  12.2 29.7 6.0 75.5 
Spain 40.7  24.3 84.9 2.8 55.0 
Finland 33.4  4.8 15.6 3.4 44.5 
France 41.8  99.9 61.1 6.4 115.9 
United Kingdom  49.0  182.8 102.4 7.4 219.1 
Greece 44.3  10.5 6.1 5.1 133.4 
Hungary 39.1  2.4 32.9 2.2 12.6 
Ireland 39.6  49.2 79.8 36.5 235.6 
Italy 52.6  69.5 62.7 5.8 119.1 
Netherlands 48.1  75.8 56.1 12.7 236.5 
Poland 40.0  4.6 45.1 1.0 13.9 
Portugal 44.2  9.0 4.4 4.2 122.4 
Slovakia 32.2  2.7 6.3 5.4 35.5 
Slovenia 26.6  0.3 19.6 0.6 2.8 
Sweden 44.3  37.6 38.3 9.6 162.8 
Rest Europe  33.0  2.1 20.3 2.7 17.3 
Source: WorldScan simulations. Numbers are derived from the final year of the baseline, 2040.  
Balassa index indicates the share of other commercial services in total exports weighted by the word-wide average. 
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4  Trade-induced effects of the Services Directive 
This section analyses the eocnomic effects of increases in other commercial services trade 
(including and excluding the country of origin principle) using WorldScan. It is not a complete 
welfare analysis of the Services Directive, since we analyse only the trade-induced effect of the 
Directive. We are not able to analyse the welfare effects of the increase in FDI stocks in the 
commercial services sector. By consequence, the outcomes of the present analysis of extra trade 
induced by the Services Directive have to be considered as a lower bound. The present analysis 
excludes also the temporary posting of foreign service providers. This is an fiercely debated 
topic, but the model does not allow for analysing this part of the directive. In addition, some 
other positive and negative welfare effects are not included, such as the policy costs of 
implementing the directive, the dynamic effects of extra competition on innovation and 
productivity, and the transformation costs of sectoral shifts in the economy.  
Given the baseline described in Section 3, we simulate the implementation of the trade-
stimulating features of the Services Directive (see Section 2). We conduct this analysis for the 
lower- and upper bound of the trade increase, including and excluding the CoOP. Cross-border 
trade is stimulated by reducing bilateral trade barriers in other commercial services in the 
model. The reduction of the bilateral trade barrier is calibrated such that the reduction increases 
bilateral trade ex ante to the extent predicted by Kox et al. (2004a). They have estimated the 
potential trade increase for every bilateral commercial services trade flow in the EU.
24 Given 
our baseline we incorporate this in the model by reducing the bilateral non-tariff barriers ( 
NTBs) in other commercial services in such a way that every trade flow increases by the 
amount estimated ex ante. The simulations subsequently show the macroeconomic and sectoral 
effects of the trade increase. 
In order to induce the estimated bilateral trade increases we have to calibrate the bilateral  
NTBs. Lejour et al. (2004) have developed a method to calibrate the  NTBs. Basically, they 
translate the potential trade increase into a (Samuelson iceberg) trade-cost equivalent of the 
barriers. In particular, we recalibrate the Armington demand functions in the model (i.e. the 
preference parameters) such that these reproduce the original trade data (while NTBs are 
incorportated). Abolishing  NTBs in the model, we simulate the (ex ante) trade levels that 
correspond to the predictions from the empirical model. This procedure is explained more 
extensively in Lejour et al. (2004, 2006). 
 
24Note that Kox et al. (2004a) have calculated these numbers for bilateral trade in other commercial services between the 
old EU member states. They have also constructed regulatory heterogeneity indices including Poland, Czech Republic and 
Hungary as bilateral trade partner. We use this information to estimate the bilateral trade increases with respect to these 
countries. For the other regions, Slovakia, Slovenia and Rest EU (Baltic States, Cyprus, and Malta) there are no OECD 
regulatory data available to construct the heterogeneity indices. We assume that the regulatory obstacles between Slovakia 
and its trading partners are the same as for the Czech Republic and its trading partners, and similarly for Slovenia compared 
to Hungary, and Rest EU to Poland. As a consequence, the results for Slovakia, Slovenia, and Rest EU are more uncertain 
than for the other countries.  20 | 
We use WorldScan to analyse the general-equilibrium effects of the reduction in  NTBs on 
production, consumption, and prices. The abolishment of the  NTBs has three effects. 
First, it affects relative prices of intermediate inputs and final goods. This changes the 
demand for different goods from different origins, leading to trade creation and trade diversion. 
Without NTBs prices will better reflect relative scarcities so that countries can better exploit the 
gains from trade. Trade creation will cause a reallocation in production in all countries, 
resulting in efficiency improvements and a corresponding expansion in output. The increase in 
bilateral trade may also come at the expense of trade with third countries, which is referred to as 
trade diversion. 
The second implication of abolishing  NTBs is that it affects the terms of trade, i.e. the price 
of exports relative to the price of imports. Removing  NTBs costs between two countries will 
typically cause a terms-of-trade gain in both countries. To understand this, note that we measure 
the terms of trade as the price of exports relative to imports that holds just outside the domestic 
border. For imports, the price includes cost of freight (the iceberg costs
25 and the c.i.f. - 
inclusive of cost, insurance and freight - that are present in the database) but not import taxes. 
For exports the price is f.o.b. (free on board) and includes export taxes but excludes the iceberg 
costs. Lower NTBs can thus raise the price of exports relative to imports in both countries. 
Although an improvement in the terms-of-trade may have adverse effects on production of a 
country, it can improve welfare since it raises the value of production goods, relative to imports. 
This welfare gain will be reflected in a higher volume of consumption. 
Third, in contrast to tariffs, NTBs involve substantial income effects since they reflect real 
trade costs from which no one generates income, e.g. time needed to fulfil regulatory 
procedures. Reducing these real costs and thereby the prices of services imports, increases 
purchase power possibilities. The volume of imports will increase, while the volume of exports 
will initially not change. 
 
This section is structured as follows. Sub-section 4.1 discusses the trade effects of a full 
implementation of the Services Directive. This sub-section is relatively extensive because we 
discuss detailed results for some countries. We defer from a detailed analysis of individual 
countries in the subsequent sub-sections in order to avoid a repetition of arguments. Sub-section 
4.2 looks at the effects of excluding the country of origin principle form the Directive. Finally, 
sub-section 4.3 presents a sensitivity analyses with respect to the different forms of competition 
and economies of scale in the various industries. In sub-section 4.1 and 4.2 we assume 
imperfect competition with economies to scale in nearly all manufacturing and servcies sectors. 
However, the degree of economies of scale is not undoubted. As an extreme we assume perfect 
competition with constant returns to scale in all sectors. We compeare the results with those in 
sub-section 4.1. 
 
25 NTBs are modelled as iceberg costs: the idea that a share of the services melts away during the phase of trade. | 21 
4.1 Main  results 
We have simulated the increase of commercial services trade in the EU associated with the 
lower and upper bound of about respectively 30% and 62% from Kox et al. (2004a).  
Table 4.1 presents the reductions of the  NTBs after calibration in percentages of the import 
value. The reductions in the bilateral NTBs differ per country pair, based upon the bilateral 
trade increase, see Annex 1 for the upper bound scenario. For the sake of presentation we have 
averaged the bilateral NTB reductions over the destination countries. Table 4.1 shows that the 
reductions of  NTBs are higher for the upper bound scenario than for the lower bound scenario. 
This is because abolishment of higher  NTBs leads to overall higher trade effects which 
correspond to average 62% increase in commercial services trade in the upper bound scenario. 
The reductions of  NTBs are relatively low for exporting countries as Belgium, the Netherlands, 
France and United Kingdom. This corresponds to the estimated trade effects in Section 2. For 
the old Member States Greece, Portugal, Austria, Denmark, Spain, and Italy the NTB 
reductions are relatively large. For the new Member States the reductions are even larger. Large 
reductions reflect relatively big changes in regulatory heterogeneity caused by much initial 
heterogeneity. The reduction of these barriers according to the proposed directive will have the 
largest trade effects in these countries. 
Table 4.1  Reduction in non-tariff barriers due to less differences in regulation 
Country  Lower bound  Upper bound        Country  Lower bound  Upper bound 
Austria  13.0 22.5        Hungary  13.8 24.0 
Belgium-Luxembourg  10.8 18.9        Ireland  12.0 20.8 
Czech Republic  15.6 27.2        Italy  13.1 22.5 
Germany  11.6 20.2        Netherlands  10.2 18.1 
Denmark  14.1 23.9        Poland  16.1 27.8 
Spain  12.6 21.7        Portugal  14.2 24.9 
Finland  11.6 20.2        Rest EU 
a) 
16.1 27.8 
France  11.3 19.9        Slovakia 
a) 
15.6 27.2 
United Kingdom  11.1 19.3        Slovenia 
a) 
13.8 24.0 
Greece  13.5 23.4        Sweden  11.7 20.5 
Source : WorldScan and Kox et al. (2004a). Numbers are expressed as percentages of import value. 
The reductions in bilateral  NTBs are averages over the destination countries of the exporting country. 
a)
 The numbers for these countires are identical to those for Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary respectively, because of the reasons  
mentioned in footnote 24. 
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4.1.1 Macro  effects 
Ex ante, the Services Directive will increase the volume of other commercial services trade by 
at least 30% and at most 62%. This is substantial for the sectors involved; however at a 
macroeconomic level the increase is modest. Kox et al. (2004b) show that other commercial 
services trade makes up only about 13% of total EU trade. Moreover, nearly half of other 
commercial services trade is directed to countries outside the EU. So, only about 7% of EU 
trade is affected by the Services Directive. The substantial increase in other commercial 
services trade leads to a total trade increase in the EU of 2% to about 5%. The results in Table 
4.2 confirm this. Overall, the trade effects are slightly less than this rule of thumb calculation. 
Table 4.2   Macroeconomic effects of the trade increase due to the Services Directive  
                               (% volume changes) 











EU  0.3 0.5 0.6 1.7 0.7 1.2 1.3 3.6 











Czech Republic  2.1  1.5  1.1 4.8 4.9 3.5 2.5  10.9 
Germany  0.4 0.6 0.6 1.2 0.9 1.3 1.4 2.6 
Denmark  0.4 0.6 0.4 2.2 0.9 1.3 1.1 4.7 
Spain  0.2 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.6 2.2 
Finland  0.5 0.6 0.5 2.0 1.1 1.2 1.0 4.2 
France  0.3 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.6 0.8 0.8 2.1 
United  Kingdom  0.0 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.8 1.6 
Greece  0.2 0.4 0.4 1.8 0.4 0.9 0.9 4.0 
Hungary 1.7  1.4  1.2 4.7 3.8 3.2 2.6  10.3 
Ireland  -0.2 1.5 1.7 0.4 -0.5 3.1 3.5 0.7 
Italy  0.3 0.4 0.5 1.2 0.6 0.9 1.0 2.6 
Netherlands  0.4 0.8 1.6 1.5 0.7 1.6 2.2 3.2 
Poland  0.6 0.6 1.3 2.8 1.4 1.5 1.7 6.6 
Portugal  0.2 0.4 0.7 1.4 0.5 0.9 1.1 3.1 
Slovakia  1.3 1.7 1.6 3.5 3.0 3.8 3.7 8.2 
Slovenia 1.7  1.3  1.3 5.5 3.6 2.7 2.7  11.7 
Sweden  0.3 0.7 0.7 1.6 0.6 1.4 1.4 3.5 
Rest EU  1.2  1.4  1.5 4.9 2.7 3.4 3.6  11.2 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are cumulative volume changes compared to the baseline in 2040. 
 
The country-specific effects on total exports and imports differ depending on the reduction in 
regulatory heterogeneity between the countries and their most important trading partners in 
other commercial services trade, their competitiveness, and compensating changes in 
manufacturing trade. Because of the last reason the relation between changes in total exports 
and the NTB reductions in other commercial services is weak.
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Given the small effects on total trade, it is not surprising that the GDP effects are modest, on 
average ranging from 0.3% to 0.7% in the EU in 2040. They vary between 3.0% and 4.9% for 
the new EU member states with the largest trade increases, and equal about 0.5% for countries 
with the lowest trade increases for the upper bound case. The consumption effects are slightly 
larger. The reason is that lowering NTBs reduces consumer prices (in particular import prices) 
without lowering export prices. So imports and consumption possibilities expand.  
The variation in country effects requires some explanation. First, there is the terms-of-trade 
effect. Nearly all Member States experience a terms-of-trade gain reflected by larger increases 
in consumption than in production. Exceptions are some of the new Member States: the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. For the other new Member States the terms-of-trade gain is 
modest. The reason is that these countries hardly export services (see Table 4.2), hence the 
increase in the producer price resulting from lower NTBs has hardly any impact on the terms of 
trade. For countries like Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden the terms-of-trade gains are relatively large. These are all 
countries that specialise in providing other commercial services (see Table 3.2). Consumption 
increases at least 0.5% more than production and for Austria it even exceeds 1% in the upper 
bound scenario.  The large terms-of-trade gain in Ireland is remarkable, together with the slight 
deterioration of total production. 
The size of the NTB reduction also matters for the country effects. For example, the trade 
effects for France, Spain and Portugal are modest. From the data we know that these countries 
trade relatively much with each other and that the regulatory heterogeneity between these 
countries is small, although for Spain and Portugal the average NTB (not weighted by trade 
volumes) is relatively high. For the United Kingdom services trade is not much stimulated 
because of the  limited heterogeneity in regulation with other countries. By consequence, the 
economic effects are also modest. For countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia, the regulatory heterogeneity with their most important trading partners 
is much larger and so is the effect of less heterogeneity induced by the Services Directive.  
 
The effects on real wages correspond to the consumption effects. In general the increase in real 
wages is 0.1 to 0.2% smaller or larger than the consumption increase. In the Czech Republic 
and Hungary real wages increase less than consumption in the upper bound scenario. Because 
regional employment is exogenous in CGE models, any change in employment in the 
commercial services sector is met by offsetting employment changes in the other sectors. The 
changes in real wages equal the changes in real labour income. 
In reality extra labour demand in other commercial services and the corresponding wages 
change could affect labour supply or the unemployment rate. This could induce extra labour 
supply, increase employment and offset the real wage increase to some extent. However, 
structural unemployment and labour supply are heavily affected by national labour market and 24 | 
social policies. The extra labour demand induced bt the serivces Directive will hardly influence 
this relation.    
 
The macroeconomic effects do not reflect a full-scale analysis of the Services Directive, since 
the Services Directive will also stimulate foreign direct investment, which is not taken into 
account in this analysis.
27 From this perspective our results are substantially larger than those of 
Copenhagen Econmics (2004). They analyse the Services Directive using an applied general 
equilibrium model including FDI (the CETM model). Overall consumption increases with about 
0.6% in the European Union. This number corresponds to our result, but Copenhagen 
Economics also includes the effects of extra FDI induced by the directive in their analysis. For 
this reason Voigt (2005) considers the estimates of Copenhagen Economics to be a conservative 
estimate. It is difficult to disentangle the effects of more cross-border trade and foreign 
commercial presence in the Copenhagen Economics study, because both effects are analysed 
simultanously. However, it is apparent that the trade effects in their study are much smaller than 
ours.  
4.1.2  Impact on sectoral competitiveness 
Increase in total exports are mainly due to the boost in trading other commercial services. These 
exports increase by at least 14% and at most 30%, see Table 4.3. Notice that these exports 
consists of intra-EU and extra-EU exports. Because intra-EU exports form about half of total 
exports in other commercial services, e.g. a 62% increase in intra-EU trade leads to a 30% 
increase for the total EU-exports in this sector. Exports in other sectors also increase slightly: 
their producer prices decrease slightly, because intermediate inputs of other commercial 
services become cheaper within the EU. Production increases across all sectors except for 
research and development. Employment in other commercial services is reduced due to the 
restructuring of that sector in response to increased market access. Because of market 
integration, the most competitive countries will specialise in providing other commercial 
services. In these countries labour productivity rises and other commercial services output 
demands less inputs, including labour. Other sectors will attract more labour. 
 
Table 4.4 shows that for the EU as a whole the sectoral effects are modest: value added will 
increase by at least 0.5% and at most 1.0% for the EU. The value added effect for other 
commercial services is not much larger than the increase in GDP (see Table 4.2), because other 
commerical services form about half of total value added and value added in other sectors 
increases as well. 
 
27 Simulating the increase in FDI requires an additional modelling effort in WorldScan. This project will be conducted the first 
half year of 2006.  | 25 
Table 4.3   EU-wide sectoral effects of the Services Directive (% changes) 
  Lower bound    Upper bound 
Sector  Employment  Value added Exports Employment Value added  Exports 
Agriculture  − 0.3  0.1 − 0.1 − 0.6 0.3  − 0.2 
Energy  − 0.2  0.4 0.3 − 0.4 0.8  0.7 
Low Tech Manufacturing  − 0.1  0.4 0.1 − 0.2 0.9  0.3 
Medium-Low Tech  0.0 0.4 0.4 − 0.1 1.0  1.0 
Medium-High Tech  0.2 1.0 1.0 0.6 2.2  2.3 
High Tech Manufacturing  1.3  2.1 2.3 3.1 4.8  5.3 
Other Commercial Services  − 0.1  0.5 13.9 − 0.1 1.0  29.5 
Other Services  0.1  0.3 − 0.8 0.2 0.7  − 1.7 
Research and Development  − 0.5  − 0.3 − 1.2 − 0.6   
Transport 0.0  0.5 0.2 0.0 1.0  0.3 
Total 0.0  0.3 1.7 0.0 0.7  3.6 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are cumulative changes compared to the baseline in 2040. 
 
The country-specific results differ, depending on the competitiveness of the commercial 
services sector across Europe, and the reduction in regulatory barriers. In particular Austria, the 
Netherlands, Germany, United Kindom, Portugal, Sweden and Ireland expand value added in 
that sector compared to the EU average. From Table 4.2 we know that these countries are also 
specialised in providing other commercial services.  Their imports do not increase much, but 
value added does. 
Within this group of countries there are remarkable differences which can be explained by 
the degree of specialisation and the reduction of the  NTBs. The increase in Portugese exports is 
almost twice that of the Netherlands, but growth in value added is much smaller. We can 
explain the large boost in Portugese exports from the higher reduction in  NTBs (see Table 4.1) 
but Portugese imports accelerate as well. In contrast, the Netherlands is more specialised in 
commercial services and benefits from the larger market for commercial services, which 
explains the difference in value added. 
For the new member states, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
exports surge, but that is also the case for their imports. Although other commercial services 
will contribute to a larger extent to their exports, these countries do not specialise in that sector. 
In these countries value added in commercial services decreases by 5% at least, because 
provision of services shifts to other countries in Europe. The new member states specialise 
more in manufacturing. Although the Services Directive does not expand the other commercial 
services sector in these countries, the implementation of that directive is still beneficial. These 
countries shift some of their resources to other sectors in which they are more productive. 
Moreover, other commercial services become relatively cheaper. 26 | 
Table 4.4   EU-wide volume changes in other commercial services (% changes) 
            Lower bound               Upper bound 
Country  Value added Exports Value added Exports 
EU  0.5 13.9 1.0 29.5 
Austria  1.3 20.1 3.1 45.1 
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.4 13.2 1.1 27.3 
Czech Republic  − 5.7 23.3 − 13.0 50.6 
Germany  1.1 17.4 2.3 36.9 
Denmark  − 0.5 16.1 − 1.0 35.1 
Spain  − 0.2 12.7 − 0.4 26.9 
Finland  − 0.4 14.6 − 0.9 30.4 
France  0.3 10.2 0.7 21.9 
United Kingdom  0.7 12.0 1.5 25.2 
Greece  0.4 14.6 1.0 32.0 
Hungary  − 2.5 13.0 − 5.3 27.7 
Ireland  2.0 9.7 4.3 20.3 
Italy  0.4 13.4 0.8 28.6 
Netherlands  1.4 14.2 2.9 29.7 
Poland  − 1.0 20.9 − 2.4 48.9 
Portugal  0.8 22.3 1.8 49.1 
Slovakia  − 0.4 26.6 − 1.1 58.9 
Slovenia  − 7.0 15.2 − 15.0 30.6 
Sweden  0.8 13.2 1.7 28.5 
Rest EU  − 4.7 24.4 − 10.9 54.2 
Source: WorldScan simulations. All numbers are relative volume changes in 2040 compared to the baseline. 
 
4.1.3  Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom 
As further illustration, Table 4.5 presents the changes in exports and production for all sectors 
in Poland, Germany and the UK for the upper bound scenario including the CoOP. These 
countries represent the new Member States, old Member States with larger than average effects 
and Member States which are less affected. In Poland value added increases in all sectors 
except other commercial services. This sector becomes much more open to trade, but the 
accompanying large influx of services affects domestic services provision negatively. Poland is 
not very competitive in this sector. This might be surprising taking in mind the numerous 
(newspaper) stories on expected large flows of Polish plumbers and other service providers 
which would undercut prices of domestic producers if the directive is implemented.  | 27 
Nevertheless, this type of  trade is not analysed here.
28 We concentrate on cross-border trade in 
which producers remain primarily in their home country.  
Table 4.5   Sectoral effects of the Services Directive for various countries, upperbound case  
  (% changes) 
 Poland   Germany    UK 
Sector  Value added  Exports Value added Exports Value added  Exports 
Agriculture 1.2  − 1.0 − 0.6 − 0.8 − 0.3  − 0.1 
Energy 2.0  2.8 − 0.7 − 0.7 − 0.3  − 0.7 
Low Tech Manufacturing  2.7  2.8 − 0.1 − 1.0 − 0.7  − 1.5 
Medium-Low Tech  6.6 7.1 − 3.1 −3.3 − 1.9  − 2.5 
Medium-High Tech  8.0 8.8 − 3.0 − 2.7 − 2.9  − 3.8 
High Tech Manufacturing  15.8  17.6 − 5.3 − 5.8 − 2.3  − 2.7 
Other Commercial Services  − 2.4  48.9 2.3 36.9 1.5  25.2 
Other Services  0.5  − 2.6 0.9 − 2.2 0.3  − 0.2 
Research and Development  7.9  − 5.8 − 2.3   
Transport 2.8  2.1 − 0.3 − 1.4 0.2  − 0.5 
Total 1.4  6.6 0.9 2.6 0.1  1.6 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are cumulative changes compared to the baseline in 2040. 
 
Labour and capital will move from other commercial services to other sectors in particular 
manufacturing. The sectors inhibiting large economies of scale (see the share of fixed costs in 
Annex 2) such as high-tech manufacturing will expand most. Because these sectors also 
demand R&D, production in the latter sector also increases substantially. The technology 
sectors benefit from extra labour and capital and the cheaper intermediates from other 
commerical services. The percentage increase in value added is much larger than the decrease 
in other commercial services, but on average the latter sector is relatively large (see Table 3.1) 
and thus has a big impact on the total economy. Exports in nearly all sectors increase, but the 
effects are most pronounced in other commercial services.  
For the other countries like Germany and the UK, value added increases in other 
commercial services and to some extent also in other services. These sectors attract more capital 
and labour at the expense of technology sectors and R&D. The sectoral shift is bigger for 
Germany than for the UK as is also the case for the trade effects. The average NTB reduction 
for Germany is only slightly larger than for the UK (see Table 4.1), but the trade effects are 
much larger. The reason is that Germany decreases its regulatory heterogeneity more with its 
most important trading partners than the UK does. The larger trade effects induces larger 
 
28 In WTO terms this is called mode IV  trade. This mode of trade represents services provision by individuals going abroad 
to deliver the service in other ocuntries. This type of trade is not subject of analysis here. If these individuals are employed at 
a (Polish) firm which delivers the service abroad, than it is cross-border trade. The latter mode of trade is the subject of the 
analysis here. 28 | 
production effects. Because other commercial services contribute more to value added in 
Germany than in the UK (see Table 4.2), the macro effects are also larger for Germany. 
4.2  Relevance of the country-of-origin-principle 
A key element of the Services Directive is the ‘country of origin’ principle (CoOP). A service 
provider who operates legally in one Member State, can trade its services in other Member 
States without having to comply with further rules −save for a few explicitly named derogatory 
issues− in those “host” Member States.  
Section 4.1 discussed the trade effects of a complete implementation of the Services 
Directive including the CoOP. This section focuses on the role of the CoOP by comparing the 
results in Section 4.1 with simulation results when the Services Directive is implemented 
without the CoOP. Without the CoOP EU service exporters are hampered by regulation in the 
importing country. As a result, trade effects for the commercial services sector will be smaller. 
In fact, we have estimated the potential trade increase for every bilateral commercial services 
trade flow in the EU. For the EU as a whole commercial services trade can increase by 19% to 
38%, see Table 2.4. Hence, the CoOP accounts for over one-third of the overall trade increase 
in commercial services caused by a full implementation of the Services Directive. Obviously, 
the CoOP plays an important role in the Services Directive. 
We simulate the effects of the amended Services Directive by reducing the  NTBs in other 
commercial services in such a way that every trade flow increases by the amount estimated ex 
ante without CoOP. These reductions of  NTBs are smaller compared to those in Table 4.1. 
However, relative differences between countries are almost unchanged, see Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6    Reduction in non-tariff barriers due to less differences in regulation (without CoOP) 
Country  Lower bound  Upper bound        Country  Lower bound  Upper bound 
Austria  8.7  15.7        Hungary  9.3 16.7 
Belgium-Luxembourg  7.3  13.1        Ireland  8.1 14.5 
Czech Republic  10.4  18.8        Italy  8.9 15.8 
Germany  7.8  14.0        Netherlands  6.7 12.3 
Denmark  9.7  17.0        Poland  10.7 19.3 
Spain  8.5  15.2        Portugal  9.4 17.2 
Finland  7.8  14.0        Rest EU 
a) 
10.7 19.3 
France  7.5  13.7        Slovakia 
a) 
10.4 18.8 
United Kingdom  7.5  13.4        Slovenia 
a) 
9.3 16.7 
Greece  9.1  16.3        Sweden  7.8 14.1 
Source : WorldScan and section 2. Numbers are expressed as percentages of import value. 
The reductions in bilateral  NTBs are averages over the destination countries of the exporting country. 
a)
 The numbers for these countires are identical to those for Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary respectively, because of the reasons  
mentioned in footnote 24. | 29 
4.2.1 Macroeconomic  effects 
Because only about 7% of total EU trade is affected by the Services Directive, the increase in 
other commercial services trade would lead to a total trade increase in the EU of slightly more 
than 1% to about 3%. The results in Table 4.7 confirm this.  
The results show that the increase in GDP and consumption for the EU are at least 50% 
higher if the CoOP is brought into force (compare Table 4.2 and 4.7). Again, the new member 
states benefit most from the Services Directive. For these countries GDP increases for the upper 
bound scenario by 1 to 3%, whereas for the EU-15 GDP increases on average only 0.4% for the 
upper bound scenario (instead of 0.6% including CoOP).  
Table 4.7   Macroeconomic effects of the trade increase due to Services Directive without CoOP 
                                (% volume changes) 
                  Lower bound                 Upper bound 
Country  GDP Consumption Exports GDP Consumption  Exports 
EU  0.2 0.3 1.0 0.4 0.7 2.2 
Austria  0.3 0.6 1.3 0.6 1.3 2.7 
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.2 0.7 1.0 0.4 1.3 2.0 
Czech  Republic  1.3 0.9 2.9 2.8 1.9 6.2 
Germany  0.3 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.6 
Denmark  0.3 0.4 1.4 0.5 0.8 2.8 
Spain  0.1 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.3 1.3 
Finland  0.3 0.3 1.3 0.7 0.7 2.5 
France  0.2 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.5 1.3 
United  Kingdom  0.0 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4 1.0 
Greece  0.1 0.2 1.1 0.3 0.5 2.4 
Hungary  1.1 0.9 2.9 2.2 1.8 6.1 
Ireland  − 0.1  0.9 0.3 − 0.3 1.9  0.5 
Italy  0.2 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.5 1.6 
Netherlands  0.2 0.5 1.0 0.4 1.0 2.0 
Poland  0.4 0.4 1.7 0.8 0.8 3.7 
Portugal  0.1 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.5 1.8 
Slovakia  0.8 1.0 2.1 1.7 2.1 4.6 
Slovenia  1.0 0.8 3.4 2.1 1.6 7.0 
Sweden  0.2 0.4 1.0 0.4 0.8 2.1 
Rest  EU  0.7 0.9 2.9 1.6 1.9 6.4 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are cumulative changes compared to the baseline in 2040. 
 
Naturally, these differences in growth are the direct result of the size of the NTB reductions (see 
Table 4.6), the terms-of-trade effects, and the reallocation of other commercial services and 
other sectors over Europe. For the new Member States, the reallocation towards manufacturing 
and the size of the NTB reductions drive the economic results, the terms-of-trade effect is less 
important (or sometimes even negative). Comparing the exports for these countries in Table 4.2 30 | 
with those in Table 4.7 shows that, if the CoOP is not implemented, these countries miss out on 
an additional 2% to 4.5% increase in exports.  
For countries  as Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Ireland, The 
Netherlands, and Sweden the positive terms-of-trade effects are relatively important. In Ireland 
production slightly deteriorates due to the reallocation from manufacturing to other commercial 
services. The country-specific effects on exports and imports differ depending on the reduction 
in regulatory heterogeneity between the countries and their most important trading partners in 
other commercial services trade. Countries with modest trade effects, such as Spain, Portugal 
and France miss out on 0.5 to 1% additional exports. 
 
Copenhagen Economics (2005) has also analysed the country of origin principle. According to 
their analysis CoOP contributes about 10% to the total welfare effects. These total effects also 
include the FDI induced effects. Because consumption increases with about 0.6% due to the 
Services Directive, the role of CoOP is limited to about 0.05% in consumption volume terms 
for the EU as a whole. In our analysis CoOP is much more important; it adds 0.2% to 0.5% to 
consumption if Tables 4.7 and 4.2 are compared. The main reason for this difference is the 
assessment of the trade effects of the Services Directive as stated in Section 4.1. According to 
our judgement these effects are much larger.  
The relative contributions of CoOP to the total effects of the directive in both studies are 
better comparable. According to Copenhagen Economics it is 10% of the trade and FDI-induced 
effects, in our analysis it is about a third of the trade-induced effects. At the moment we will 
include FDI-induced effects in our analysis the relative contribution of CoOP will decline. 
Other studies suggest that the welfare effect of services trade liberalisation through FDI is larger 
than through cross-border trade (FDI-induced effects account for 70% to 80% of the total 
effects).
29 If this is also the case for our FDI-amended version of WorldScan, the relative 
contribution of CoOP would be less than 20%.  
4.2.2  Impact on sectoral competitiveness 
As the directive affects commercial services, except transport, we primarily focus on that sector. 
Table 4.8 shows that the sectoral effects are modest: value added will increase by at least 0.3% 
and at most 0.6% for the EU in 2040. Remember that a full implementation of the directive 
increases value added with 0.5% to 1.0% (seee Table 4.2). Therefore, this result again shows 
that the CoOP accounts for about 40% of the GDP and consumption effects and hence plays a 
particular important role in the Services Directive. 
The country specific results differ, depending on the competitiveness of commercial 
services across Europe. In particular Austria, the Netherlands, Germany and Ireland expand 
sectoral value added. Their imports do not increase much, however, value added does. For other 
 
29 Examples are Rutherford et al. (2005), and Jensen et al. (2004). The model of Copenhagen Economics is an offshoot of 
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countries, such as the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia exports increase substantially. In 
relative terms, the size of the exports is still negligible. Although other commercial services will 
contribute to a larger extent to their exports, these countries do not specialise in this sector. In 
addition, these countries show a downward movement in value added of commercial services, 
because their services imports increase and production shifts to countries which are more 
specialised in providing other commercial services. 
Table 4.8   Volume changes in other commercial services sector without CoOP (% changes) 
            Lower bound               Upper bound 
Country  Value added Exports Value added Exports 
EU  0.3 8.7 0.6 17.8 
Austria  0.8 12.2 1.7 26.0 
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.2 8.4 0.6 16.8 
Czech Republic  − 3.4 14.1 − 7.4 29.8 
Germany  0.7 10.9 1.4 22.2 
Denmark  − 0.3 10.0 − 0.6 20.8 
Spain  − 0.1 8.0 − 0.2 16.3 
Finland  − 0.3 9.2 − 0.5 18.6 
France  0.2 6.3 0.4 13.1 
United Kingdom  0.4 7.6 0.9 15.3 
Greece  0.3 8.9 0.6 18.8 
Hungary  − 1.5 8.0 − 3.2 16.6 
Ireland  1.2 6.1 2.6 12.3 
Italy  0.2 8.4 0.5 17.2 
Netherlands  0.9 8.8 1.8 18.0 
Poland  − 0.6 12.3 − 1.3 27.2 
Portugal  0.5 13.6 1.1 28.7 
Slovakia  − 0.2 15.9 − 0.5 34.1 
Slovenia  − 4.3 9.5 − 8.9 19.2 
Sweden  0.5 8.1 1.0 16.9 
Rest EU  − 2.8 14.6 − 6.1 31.4 
Source: WorldScan simulations. All numbers are relative volume changes in 2040 compared to the baseline. 
 
4.3  Constant returns to scale and perfect competition 
The economic effects of the Services Directive depend on the the size of the NTB reductions, 
the terms-of-trade effects, and the specialization patterns. Countries like the Netherlands, 
Austria, Germany and Ireland specialize in providing services while most new Member States 
specialize in manufacturing. The extent to which specialization patterns change in response to 
the Directive depend on the degree of competition and the economies of scale in production. In 
most of the manufacturing and services sectors there are economies of scale in production 32 | 
combined with imperfection competition as the relevant market structure.
30 However the size of 
economies of scale is not undisputed. Economies to scale are hard to measure and the scarce 
empirical evidence shows a wide range of possible outcomes.  In order to tackle this uncertainty 
of economies to scale, we conduct a sensitivity analysis assuming constant returns to scale and 
perfect competition. Starting from the conviction that economies to scale are important the 
assumption of constant returns to scale is extreme. However, if the simulation results assuming 
increasing returns to scale (IRTS) as in Section 4.1 and constant returns to scale (CRTS) do not 
differ too much, the precise size of economies of scale will affect the analysis of the Services 
Directive significantly. We expect less pronounced specialisation patterns under perfect 
competition, because there aree no economies of scale that can be exploited. 
 
On a macroeconomic level, the results show that the differences between the two forms of 
competition are not particularly large. With CRTS the total trade increase ranges from 1.3% to 
2.8% (see Annex 3), whereas with IRTS the total trade increase amounts from 1.7% to 3.6%. 
Differences in GDP and consumption are very small, only 0.1% to 0.2%. Specialisation patterns 
between countries are less pronounced than with IRTS, as we would expect. This becomes more 
clear when we examine the sectoral effects in Table 4.9.
31 
The effects for the commercial services sector do not differ much between the two market 
structures for the EU as a whole. Comparing IRTS to CRTS, value added is only 0.1% higher 
and exports increase by 2 to 4.5% extra in case of scale economies. Although the magnitude of 
the differences is small the outcomes do confirm the intuition that countries specialise more in 
the relatively most efficient sectors with IRTS compared with CRTS. 
The country-specific results illustrate this intuition. From section 4.1 we know that Austria, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Ireland expand production in other commerical services. This is 
confirmed, if we compare Tables 4.4 and 4.9. However, for these countries value added and 
exports are much higher in case of scale economies, since firms can better exploit their 
technologies. Furthermore, we notice from Table 4.4 that for the new member states such as the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia exports increase substantially, as do 
their imports. In addition, value added falls for these countries. Hence, these countries become 
more specialised in other sectors than commercial services. Table 4.9 confirms these results, but 
the sectoral shifts are more modest.  For the new member states, these are manufacturing 
sectors, and not other commercial services. For example in the Czech Republic and Slovenia 
value added in commercial services falls over 10% when IRTS is introduced in the upperbound 
 
30 From several studies (e.g. Oliveira-Martins, Pilat, Scarpetta (1996a, 1996b)) we know that most sectors exhibit scale 
economies and thus also imperfect competition. We have assumed increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition for 
the sectors energy, manufacturing (all technology levels), commercial services and transport. The sectors agriculture, other 
services and research and development feature constant-returns-to-scale technologies. For more details, see Annex 2 and 
De Bruijn (2006). 
31 Gelauff and Lejour (2006) present more detailed macro-economic results for 2025 and 2040 for the lower bound scenario 
assuming perfect competition and CRTS in their study on five Lisbon policies. | 33 
scenario. In contrast, value added decreases at most 2% in the CRTS case and the increase in 
exports of other commercial services is much larger.  
Table 4.9  Volume changes in other commercial services sector (constant returns to scale) 
               Lower bound                 Upper bound 
Country 
Value added Exports Value added  Exports
EU 0.4 11.9 0.9  25.0
Austria 0.8 15.4 1.8  33.7
Belgium-Luxembourg 1.2 12.0 2.6  24.4
Czech Republic  − 0.6 28.7 − 1.2 67.7
Germany 0.7 13.9 1.5  29.1
Denmark  − 0.1 15.0 − 0.2 32.4
Spain 0.0 11.3 − 0.1 23.8
Finland  − 0.2 14.8 − 0.5 31.1
France 0.2 8.7 0.5  18.5
United Kingdom 0.4 9.9 0.9  20.4
Greece 0.1 13.3 0.2  29.1
Hungary  − 0.4 15.7 − 0.8 34.8
Ireland 0.9 8.0 2.0  16.5
Italy 0.4 11.6 0.8  24.5
Netherlands 1.1 12.3 2.2  25.5
Poland  − 0.3 21.4 − 0.8 51.5
Portugal 0.6 19.5 1.3  42.6
Slovakia  − 0.2 25.3 − 0.5 58.9
Slovenia  − 1.0 22.9 − 2.0 51.2
Sweden 0.5 12.0 1.2  25.7
Rest EU  − 0.5 17.2 − 1.1 38.5
Source: WorldScan simulations. All numbers are relative volume changes in 2040 compared to the baseline. 
 
Concluding, the macro effects are only slightly larger for IRTS technologies and imperfect 
competition than for CRTS technologies and perfect competition. Although the size of 
economies of scale is uncertain, the macroeconomic effects of the Services Directive are not 
very sensitive for assumption on the degree of economies of scale in the analysis. Nevertheless, 
different assumptions on technology and market structures do express themselves in the degree 
of specialisation if the services markets are liberalised in Europe. Scale economies lead to more 
specialisation in commercial services for countries like Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Ireland. In contrast, the new member states extract resources from this sector and specialise in 
manufacturing sectors. 34 | 
5 Conclusions 
The Services Directive is proposed by the European Commission in order to stimulate intra-EU 
cross-border trade and foreign direct investment in services. This paper contributes to the 
discussion on the economic effects of the Services Directive in two ways. First, we assess the 
economic effects as these are caused by trade-promoting character of the Directive. Second, we 
analyse the role of the country of origin principle (CoOP) within the Directive. 
 
Earlier CPB work has shown that implementation of the Services Directive could increase intra-
EU trade in services by 30 to 62 per cent. Now we find that the country of origin principle 
(CoOP) contributes significantly to this result. Deleting the CoOP from the Directive means that 
intra-EU services trade increases by 19 to 38 per cent. The bandwidth in the trade effects 
reflects a combination of statistical uncertainties and lack of clarity about the implementation of 
the Directive. 
 
We have used an applied general equilibrium model for the world economy, WorldScan, to 
assess how the expected trade impulse generated by the Directive affects production and 
consumption in the EU Member States. The results represent the long-term effects of the 
Directive. Figure 5.1 shows the macroeconomic effects for the EU as a whole. The main item-
wise conclusions are:  
•  Full implementation of the Directive − i.e. including the CoOP−  would increase European GDP 
by on average 0.3 per cent (lower bound) to 0.7 per cent (upper bound). This adds 32 to 74 
billion euros to Europe’s economy (base year 2004). When the Directive is applied without the 
CoOP, GDP increases by 0.2 and 0.4 per cent, respectively. 
•  Consumption increases slightly more, because of a positive terms-of-trade effect. In case of full 
implementation consumption is expected to go up by 0.5 per cent (lower bound) to 1.2 per cent 
(upper bound).  Leaving out the CoOP would mean that the increase is reduced to the range of 
0.3 to 0.7 per cent. 
•  Exports increase by 1.7 to 3.6 per cent for a full implementation, and by 1.0 to 2.2 per cent for 
implementation without the CoOP.   
•  It can be concluded that the CoOP accounts for a very substantial part of the Directive’s 
macroeconomic effects.  
 
The effects for the member states vary widely depending on the reductions of the non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs), trading partners, terms-of-trade effects, technology differences and 
comparative advantages. The estimated reductions in NTBs are large. They vary between 27 per  | 35 
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cent for new EU member states (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia) to 19 per 
cent for more open countries (e.g. the Netherlands, Belgium, UK and France).
32   
Since the new member states face the largest import increases these countries also 
experience the highest increases in consumption. Their terms-of-trade effects are relatively 
modest.
33  The terms-of-trade effects for the countries that specialise in other commercial 
services like Austria, the Netherlands, Ireland and Germany are substantially larger. These 
countries therefore also display more value-added growth.  
 
Part of the economic effects is caused by shifts in specialisation. Some of the original EU 
member states increase their relative specialisation in commercial services due to the more open 
borders. The new member states, however, reallocate more resources to their manufacturing 
activity.  For them this effect represents a significant part of the GDP increases, ranging 
between 3.0 and 4.9 per cent in the upper-bound trade increase. 
 
The analysis takes account of several welfare effects. One is the effect on service producers. In 
some cases, domestic service producers will be affected positively due to more export 
 
32 The given NTB reductions refer to the upper-bound trade increase. 
33 The reason is that increases in these countries producer prices of commercial services hardly affect the average export 
price due to the limited role of commercial services in exports.  36 | 
possibilities. Less competitive domestic producers will see their profits affected in a negative 
way. The balance between these two groups of producers will differ among the EU countries. 
This is reflected in the differentiated country results. 
Consumers and corporate buyers of services experience another welfare effect. More 
competition lowers service prices, and brings more variety. This will enlarge the consumer 
surplus, and thus benefit domestic consumers in most EU countries. Also producers will benefit. 
Since most of the intra-EU trade in services consists of intermediate inputs, more EU-wide 
competition will lower the unit price for intermediate inputs, while available varieties increase. 
Both effects have the potential to make client industries more competitive.   
The paper however does not explicitly analyse further dynamic productivity effects that can 
arise due to a more competitive selection process. It can be argued that, due to the more open 
borders, under-performing firms will exit sooner, so that the remaining services firms are more 
productive.  Also the effect of more competition on product and process innovation in services 
has not been explicitly taken into account.   
 
The welfare effects described above are generally positive for the EU as a whole. The country-
specific effects will vary. There are also some negative effects. Some intra-sectoral and inter-
sectoral restructuring processes and employment shifts are likely to take place in domestic 
service industries. Arguably this process may proceed in the least painful and quickest way in 
countries with the more flexible procedures for employment shifts, bankruptcy and new firm 
start-ups. We do not account for the costs of these transformation processes. 
Finally, the implementation of the EU directive has non-negligible direct policy costs may 
in Member States. Many laws and regulations pertaining to the service sector may have to be 
changed. It is imaginable that in some cases even the domestic organisational framework 
charged with implementing the previous regulations, will have to be changed. These are one-off 
welfare costs that may be compensated by more enduring welfare gains throughout the rest of 
the domestic economy.| 37 
Annex 1:  Bilateral trade increase in other commercial services  
 
Bilateral trade increase in other commercial services (maximum effect), percentages, reference year 2001 
 




Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Nether-
lands
Portugal Spain Czech 
Republic
Poland Hungary 
Denmark     129  103 85 91 85 107 69 93 41 102 47 102 106 170 241  190 
Greece 129      55 72 139 87 103 126 98 106 132 113 162 102 123 141  98 
Sweden 103  55      45 112 32 73 61 82 87 68 55 145 72 162 150  98 
United Kingdom  85  72  45    73 48 47 63 57 41 74 57 92 34 174 184  99 
Austria 91  139  112 73     80 83 80 87 77 66 43 117 100 180 139  138 
Belgium-Luxem. 85  87  32 48 80     60 45 57 32 63 45 82 74 167 169  91 
Finland 107  103  73 47 83 60     62 68 59 79 53 96 79 141 158  88 
France 69  126  61 63 80 45 62     76 66 62 39 120 80 141 134  109 
Germany 93  98  82 57 87 57 68 76     77 78 42 61 70 111 182  107 
Ireland 41  106  87 41 77 32 59 66 77     87 35 71 56 219 212  144 
Italy 102  132  68 74 66 63 79 62 78 87     82 161 101 178 156  124 
Netherlands 47  113  55 57 43 45 53 39 42 35 82     103 67 126 133  103 
Portugal 102  162  145 92 117 82 96 120 61 71 161 103     106 150 210  141 
Spain 106  102  72 34 100 74 79 80 70 56 101 67 106     162 200  105 
Czech Republic  170  123  162 174 180 167 141 141 111 219 178 126 150 162    103  129 
Poland 241  141  150 184 139 169 158 134 182 212 156 133 210 200 103     102 
Hungary 190  98  98 99 138 91 88 109 107 144 124 103 141 105 129 102     
Source: Kox et al. (2004a). | 39 
Annex 2:  Some model characteristics 
Overview of regions, sectors and production inputs in WorldScan 
Germany Agriculture  Value  added 
France  Low tech manufacturing  High-skilled labour 
United kingdom  Medium-low tech manufacturing Low-skilled  labour 
Italy  Medium-high tech manufacturing  Capital 
Spain  High tech manufacturing  R&D stock 
The Netherlands  Transport services  Fixed factor 
Belgium-Luxembourg  Other commercial services   
Denmark  Other services (government)  Intermediate goods 
Sweden Energy  Agriculture 
Finland  R&D  Low tech manufacturing 
Ireland    Medium-low tech manufacturing 
Austria    Medium-high tech manufacturing 
Greece  High tech manufacturing 
Portugal  Transport services 
Poland  Other commercial services 
Czech Republic  Other services (government) 
Hungary   
Slovakia  Energy 
Slovenia   
Rest EU   
United States   
Rest OECD   
Non OECD   
 
Model parameters for IRTS-sectors 
Sector  Fixed cost (% of total firm output) Demand elasticity 
Energy  9.7 10.3 
Low Tech Manufacturing  10.8 9.3 
Medium-Low Tech Manufacturing  10.3 9.7 
Medium-High Tech Manufacturing  9.8 10.2 
High Tech Manufacturing  8.1 12.4 
Other Commercial Services  18.5 5.4 
Transport  18.5 5.4 
Source: WorldScan calculations, De Bruijn (2006). 
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Annex 3:  Macroeconomic effects (constant returns) 
 
Macroeconomic effects of the trade increase due to Services Directive (constant returns to scale) 
                  Lower bound                 Upper bound 
Country  GDP Consumption Exports GDP Consumption  Exports 
EU  0.3 0.5 1.3 0.6 1.0 2.8 
Austria  0.5 0.9 2.1 0.9 2.0 4.5 
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.3 1.1 1.4 0.6 2.2 2.7 
Czech Republic  1.1 1.0 2.4 2.4 2.3 5.4 
Germany  0.3 0.5 1.0 0.6 1.0 2.2 
Denmark  0.5 0.6 1.9 1.0 1.3 4.0 
Spain  0.2 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.5 1.7 
Finland  0.5 0.5 1.6 1.0 1.1 3.3 
France  0.2 0.3 1.0 0.5 0.7 2.1 
United Kingdom  0.1 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.6 1.6 
Greece  0.2 0.3 1.7 0.5 0.8 3.7 
Hungary  1.1 1.0 2.8 2.3 2.2 6.0 
Ireland  0.4 1.6 1.2 0.7 3.3 2.5 
Italy  0.2 0.3 1.1 0.4 0.7 2.3 
The Netherlands  0.3 0.7 1.8 0.7 1.5 3.7 
Poland  0.6 0.6 1.9 1.3 1.3 4.4 
Portugal  0.2 0.4 1.2 0.4 0.8 2.7 
Slovakia  1.4 1.4 3.0 3.0 3.3 6.7 
Slovenia  1.0 0.7 2.7 2.1 1.6 5.6 
Sweden  0.4 0.6 1.7 0.7 1.4 3.5 
Rest EU  0.8 1.2 2.5 1.7 2.8 5.6 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are cumulative changes compared to the baseline in 2040. 
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